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Basil Stapleton*
I. Introduction
The first thing to remember is that the statute contains an absolute 
prohibition against driving dangerously or ignoring Halt signs.
No question of mens rea enters into the offence; it is no answer 
to a charge under those sections to say, “I did not mean to drive 
dangerously” or “I did not notice the Halt Sign.”1
It is quite clear from the reported cases that, if a man in fact 
adopts a manner of driving which the jury think was dangerous 
to other road users in all the circumstances, then on the issue of 
guilt it matters not whether he was deliberately reckless, careless, 
momentarily inattentive or even doing his incompetent best.2
Relying upon these dicta of Lord Goddard C.J. and Fenton 
Atkihson J., respectively, Keirstead Co. Ct. J. in R. v. Flynn3 
rules that mens rea is not an element of the offence of dangerous 
driving under section 221(4) of the Criminal Code. This marks 
the first and, to this writer’s knowledge, the only, acceptance of 
this position by a New Brunswick court. The courts of several 
other provinces have taken stands on the matter that vary widely 
from one another. The Quebec Appeal Court in Goodfellow v. 
The Queen4 flatly rejected the proposition that mens rea is not a 
necessary ingredient of this offence. On the other hand, in a 
judgment handed down several months after this Quebec decision, 
Higgins J. of the Newfoundland Supreme Court in R. v. White5 
held that the offence does not require mens rea. In R. v. Marbus* 
it would appear that the Ontario Court of Appeal by implication 
would not subscribe completely to the dicta of the English Evans 
case that the slightest negligence or even a driver’s “incom­
petent best” will always support a charge of dangerous driving.7 
Campbell C.J. of the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court in 
Russell v. The Queen8 expressed the view that “an offence (under 
s. 221(4) of the Criminal Code) is not constituted by a mere
* Basil Stapleton, II Law, U.N.B. Mr. Stapleton is a Sir James Dunn 
Scholar in Law.
1 Hill v. Baxter, [1958] 1 All E.R. 193, at p. 195.
2 R. v. Evans, [1962] 3 All E.R. 1086, at p. 1088.
3 (1964), 50 M.P.R. 96.
4 (1965), 44 C.R. 113.
5 [1965] 3 C.C.C. 147.
6 (1963), 39 C.R. 201.
7 (1963-64), 6 Crim. L.Q. 10.
8 (1965), 44 C.R. 1.
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error of judgment”.9 The state of the law in Nova Scotia is clearly 
set out in the county court and appeal court decisions in the case 
of R. v. Jeffers}0 Pottier Co. Ct. J., after an extensive review of 
the authorities, reached the conclusion that the offence of danger- 
our driving contrary to section 221(4) of the Criminal Code does 
hot require mens rea. The four members of the Nova Scotia 
Supreme Court who heard the appeal were evenly divided on the 
issue of mens rea. Reference may also be made to the Alberta 
case of R. v. Lykktmark11 in which Tavender D.C.J. decided that 
the word “dangerous” in section 221(4) imports a considerably 
greater degree of negligence than the word “careless” and that the 
former is to be classed as advertent negligence. It therefore fol­
lows, in his view, that Parliament has not chosen to define 
inarvertent negligence as a crime. Finally, in the British Columbia 
case of R. v. La Fontaine,1'1 Fraser Co. Ct. J., following recent 
English and Australian decisions, came to the conclusion that 
under section 221(4) there is an absolute prohibition against 
driving dangerously and that drunkenness is no defence.
This sampling of decisions from the courts across Canada 
makes it abundantly clear that the issue of mens rea in relation 
to the offence of dangerous driving under the Criminal Code is 
by no means settled; much uncertainty and disagreement surround 
it. Presumably this state of affairs will continue until the Supreme 
Court of Canada makes a final pronouncement. In the meantime 
it is a matter which, for several important reasons, warrants close 
and serious attention. The purpose of this article is to highlight 
the most significant aspects of the question.
II. Historical Background
At the outset it would be well to outline briefly the historical 
background of the present section 221 (4 ).13 The first enactment 
of the Criminal Code having to do with dangerous driving as a 
particular offence appeared in 1938, when an amendment was 
made to section 285 by adding subsection (6) which reads as 
follows:
(6 ) Every one who drives a motor vehicle on a street, road, 
highway, or other public place recklessly, or in a manner which 
is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances
9 Ibid., at p. 2.
10 [1964] 2 C.C.C. 346; (1965), 45 C.R. 177.
11 (1965), 51 W.W.R. 624.
12 (1964), 43 C.R. 328.
13 See Macdonald, “Careless, Negligent, Reckless Operation of Motor 
Vehicles” (1963), 6 Can. Bar Jo. 122.
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of the case, including the nature, condition, and use of the street, 
road, highway or place, and the amount of traffic which is 
actually at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be, 
on such street, road, highway, or place, shall be guilty of an 
offence . . .14
This subsection was virtually a reproduction of section 1 of 
the English Motor Car Act, 1903, the only difference being that 
the English section contained the words “or negligently” after the 
word “recklessly”. Before 1938 dangerous driving was dealt with 
in Canada by legislation of the various provinces under the general 
heading of driving to the common danger.15 The bringing of the 
offence within the Criminal Code appears to have been prompted 
by two major factors: (1) the great difficulty of getting convictions 
for motor manslaughter under the Code owing to the legal diffi­
culties of establishing the required criminal negligence and the 
leniency of juries, and (2) the decision of the House of Lords in 
Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions,16 which drew a dis­
tinction between the amount and degree of negligence involved in 
a charge of manslaughter and that involved in a charge of danger­
ous driving under the English Road Traffic Act.17 In that decision 
Lord Atkin observed:
I cannot think of anything worse for users of the road than the 
conception that no one could be convicted of dangerous driving 
unless his negligence was so great that if he had caused death he 
must be convicted of manslaughter.18
He also says:
I entertain no doubt that the statutory offence of dangerous driv­
ing may be committed, though the negligence is not of such a 
degree as would amount to manslaughter if death ensued.19
In the new Code of 1953-4 there was no section dealing with 
dangerous driving as a particular offence. The operation of motor 
vehicles was covered by section 221 which provides that:
221(1) Every one who is criminally negligent in the operation 
of a motor vehicle is guilty of:
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for 
five years, or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
14 (1938), 2 Geo. VI, c. 44, s. 16 (Can.).
15 For example, in New Brunswick, The Motor Vehicle Act (1934),
24 Geo. V, c. 20, s. 37 (N .B .).
16 [19371 A.C. 576.
17 Burns v. The King (1945), 19 M.P.R. 178, at pp. 179 and 180.
18 Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1937] A.C. 576, at 
p. 584.
19 Ibid.
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A new section, section 191, defined criminal negligence as follows:
191(1) Every one is criminally negligent who
(a) in doing anything, or
(b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do, 
shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other 
persons.
(2 ) For the purpose of this section, “duty” means a duty 
imposed by law.
In this connection the Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Revision of the Criminal Code states:20
In concluding the report on the subject of criminal negligence, 
attention should be called to the provisions of clause 221(1) 
which make it an offence to be criminally negligent in the opera­
tion of a motor vehicle whether or not such operation causes 
bodily injury to or death of another person. Because of this 
provision it has been unnecessary to retain subsections (1 ) and
(6 ) of section 285.
The note appended to section 221 in Martin’s Criminal Code 
reads as follows:
Subsec. (1 ) is new and is to be read with s. 191. It will cover 
cases where there is criminal negligence although the con­
sequences contemplated by ss. 192 and 193 do not follow. It 
replaces the former s. 285(6). Note that the former s. 951(3 ), 
which permitted an alternative verdict under that subsection in a 
case where manslaughter was charged, has been omitted in view 
of the new provisions mentioned.21
In 1960-61, section 221 of the Criminal Code was amended 
by adding thereto the following subsection:
(4 ) Every one who drives a motor vehicle on a street, road, 
highway or other public place in a manner that is dangerous to 
the public, having regard to all the circumstances including the 
nature, condition and use of such place and the amount of traffic 
that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be on such 
place, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for 
two years, or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.22
Thus dangerous driving was reinstated as a particular offence. 
It is to be noted, however, that the provision regarding driving 
recklessly as it appeared in the former section 285(6) has been
20 Report of the Royal Commission on the Revision of the Criminal 
Code (Ottawa, 1952), p. 13; cited in R. v. Jeffers, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 
346, at p. 370.
21 Martin’s Criminal Code (Toronto, 1955), p. 408.
22 (1960-1), 9 Eliz. II, c. 43, s. 3.
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deleted from the new enactment. The note to this new subsection 
in Martin’s Annual Criminal Code, 1962 reads simply:
This restores the offence that existed in s. 285(6) of the old 
Code. See the 1960-61 amendment to s. 569, post, for the 
alternative verdict as in the former s. 951(3 ).23
Section 569(4) makes an offence under section 221(4) an 
included offence under section 221(1).
Several vital questions arise at this point. (1) What were the 
ingredients of the offence of dangerous driving under the “old” 
section 285(6)? (2) Does section 221(4) simply restore the 
offence that existed in section 285(6)? (3) Are the cases dealing 
with section 285(6) applicable to section 221(4)?
For our purposes the first of these questions may be answered 
to the effect that the weight of authority supports the view that 
mens rea was a necessary ingredient in a charge of dangerous 
driving under the “old” Code. This much is conceded by some 
of the strongest proponents of the position that no mens rea is 
required under the present section.24 Support for this view is to 
be found in Loiselle v. The Queen,2* R. v. Harrison26 and R, v. 
Beaudry
As for question (2 ), it has been suggested that:
The omission of the term “recklessly” in the present s. 221(4) 
means that our present Canadian “dangerous driving” section is 
different from both the English legislation and the former 
s. 285(6). How different is a matter that remains to be settled..28
With reference to this suggestion, Coffin J. in Jeffers v. The 
Queen-0 commented:
With the greatest of deference the omission of the word “reck­
less”— bearing in bind its context in 285(6 )— creates a distinction 
without a difference. Section 285(6) creates two offences—one 
driving recklessly, the other driving dangerously. The offences 
are separate and I see no reason for excluding consideration of 
cases dealing with the dangerous driving portion of s. 285(6) 
when facing a problem arising out of s. 221(4).
It should be pointed out that this observation was made by 
Coffin J. in the course of a judgment to the effect that mens rea 
cannot be disregarded for the purposes of section 221 (4). As will
23 Martin’s Annual Criminal Code, 1962 (Toronto, 1962), p. 215.
24 See, of example, R. v. Jeffers, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 346, at 369, and R. 
v. White, [1965] 3 C.C.C. 147, at p. 150.
25 (1953), 109 C.C.C. 31.
26 [1948] O.W.N. 829.
27 (1951), 102 C.C.C. 70.
28 (1963-64), 6 Crim. L.Q. 4.
29 (1965) 45 C.R. 177, at page 192.
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appear in the course of this study, the case for those who hold the 
opposing view rests to a considerable extent upon that omission 
being regarded as creating much more than “a distinction without 
a difference”. Therefore, to find more satisfactory answers to 
questions (2) and (3) we must turn to an analysis of the reason­
ing on both sides of the issue.
III. Abolition of Mens Rea
Of the four Canadian decisions cited at the outset in support 
of the “no-mms rea” position two, Regina v. Flynn30 and Regina 
v. LaFontaine,sl are based entirely upon the English cases of Hill 
v. Baxter*- and Regina v. Evans,33 to the effect that The Road Act84 
contains an absolute prohibition against driving dangerously and 
that no question of mens rea enters into the offence. These views 
are accepted without reservation as applying equally to section 
221 (4) of the Criminal Code of Canada. The Newfoundland case, 
Regina v. White,3* follows the decision in Regina v. Jeffersf9 and 
the latter is the only one of the four in which an analysis of the 
issue in terms of the “Canadian setting” is undertaken. It is appro­
priate, therefore, that the judgment of Pottier Co. Ct. J. be con­
sidered in some detail.
The learned justice begins his analysis with a consideration 
of the American and English positions. After a brief investigation 
he concludes:
It appears to me that the American cases when dealing with 
“endangering the public” by driving a motor vehicle, hold that if 
the physical aspect is present and the driving is voluntary on the 
part of the operator, an offence has been committed, the intention 
of the accused is not a matter of concern.’7
A study of the English law up to and including the Evans 
case leads him to conclude that:
One can summarize the law of England with reference to the 
mental element in dangerous driving as saying that it matters not 
what the driver thought or whether he did his best in the circum­
stances.38 There is no mental aspect necessary if there is a
30 (1964), 50 M.P.R. 96.
31 (1964), 43 C.R. 328.
32 [1958] 1 Q.B. 277.
33 [1963] 1 Q.B. 412.
34 (1960), 8 & 9 Eliz. II, c. 16, s. 2 (1 ).
35 [1965] 3 C.C.C. 147.
36 [1964] 2 C.C.C. 346.
37 Ibid., at p. 352.
38 J. E. Hah Williams, “Causing Death by Dangerous Driving—The 
Objective Test” (1963), 26 Mod. Law Rev., 430, at p. 432.
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dangerous driving physically. The accused must be guilty unless 
it can be said that the driving was through no fault of the 
accused on account of something beyond his control.89
In the course of this analysis, Pottier Co. Ct. J. dismisses the 
Andrews case as an authority of what is dangerous driving. This 
is of interest because, as was pointed out above, it appears that 
that case strongly influenced the decision to include a dangerous 
driving section in the Criminal Code in 1938. However, this point 
is now of academic interest since it is well established and accepted 
that mens rea was an element of the offence created in 1938.
This latter fact is but one of the seemingly formidable bar­
riers which one must overcome in reaching the conclusion that the 
mental element is no longer required. In addition, there is the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in O ’Grady v. Sparling,40 
which held that sections 191 and 221 of the Code only touched 
advertent negligence. Further, there is the reaffirmation by the 
Supreme Court in R. v. King,*1 of the general principle that, in the 
words of Wright J. in Sherras v. DeRutzen,*-
There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a 
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the Act, is an essential ingredi­
ent in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced 
either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the 
subject-matter with which it deals and both must be considered.
This is strengthened by the words of Lord Goddard which he 
expressed in Brend v. Wood43 to the effect that:
It is of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of 
the subject that a court should always bear in mind that, unless 
a statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out 
mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, the court should not 
find a man guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless 
he has a guilty mind.
A barrier to the position that there is no mens rea is the view 
of the Royal Commission on the Revision of the Criminal Code 
to the effect that the inclusion of section 221(1) in the revised 
Code made it unnecessary to retain subsection (6) of section 285 
of the old Code.
Pottier Co. Ct. J. undertakes to answer each of these argu­
ments. With reference to the first he maintains that decisions 
under the “old” section 285(6) are not relevant to charges under
39 R. v. Jeffers, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 346, at p. 359.
40 [1960] S.C.R. 804.
41 [1962] S.C.R. 746.
42 [1895] 1 Q.B. 918, at p. 921; cited in R. v. King, ibid., at pp. 759-60.
43 (1946), 62 T.L.R. 462.
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the present section 221(4). This is so because of the respective 
structures of the old and new Codes. The old section 285(6) 
provided for both dangerous and reckless driving and there was 
no definition of, or provision for, criminal negligence elsewhere in 
the Code. Both of the acts envisaged by section 285(6) were 
treated as implying “something more than mere inadvertence or 
mere thoughtlessness, or mere negligence or mere error of judg­
ment”.44 Now, however, the situation is quite different. With the 
revision of the Code in 1954 the offence of criminal negligence in 
the operation of a motor vehicle was specifically provided for 
under section 221 (1 ). If wanton or reckless disregard were neces­
sary ingredients of dangerous driving it would have meant that 
dangerous driving was included in these new criminal negligence 
provisions. However, if that were so there would have been no 
need to enact section 221(4) (dangerous driving) in 1960-61. 
The fact that a special section was provided to make dangerous 
driving an offence shows that it was not included in the previous 
legislation of 1954. Thus, section 221(4) is to be regarded not 
as replacing the former section 285(6) but as creating a new 
offence. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the new 
subsection does not contain a provision for reckless driving as did 
the old. This, then, is the learned Judge’s answer to both the first 
and fourth arguments listed above.
As to the second argument, Pottier Co. Ct. J. finds not only 
that O ’Grady v. Sparling is not against his position but that it, in 
fact, lends support to it. When the Supreme Court of Canada held 
in that case that sections 191 and 221 of the Code only touched 
advertent, but not inadvertent negligence, section 221(4) had not 
yet been enacted. Thus, that decision cannot be regarded as refer­
ring to the present offence of dangerous driving. Furthermore, the 
court went on to say that inadvertent negligence may be dealt with 
by Parliament when it chooses to do so. In this connection, the 
following extract from the judgment of Judson J. (with whom the 
majority of the court concurred) is of interest.
What the Parliament of Canada has done is to define “advertent 
negligence” as a crime under ss. 191(1) and 221(1). It has not 
touched “inadvertent negligence.” Inadvertent negligence is dealt 
with under the provincial legislation in relation to the regulation 
of highway traffic. That is its true character and until Parliament 
chooses to define it in the Criminal Code as “crime”, it is not 
crime.45
Pottier Co. Ct. J., interprets this as meaning that inadvertent 
negligence covers cases of exceeding speed limits, going through
44 R. v. Karasick, [1950] 2 W.W.R. 399, at p. 400.
45 [1960] S.C.R. 804, at p. 809.
U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL 57
red lights, and the like; that intention or mens rea is not a neces­
sary ingredient for an offence when exceeding speed limits or goitag 
through red lights; and that the Canadian Parliament can make 
such offences crimes if and when it chooses to do so. The learned 
Judge then proceeds to point out that at common law:
Negligence, of which a guilty mind was a part, was criminal 
negligence, that is advertent negligence, and according to O’Grady 
v. Sparling that sort of negligence is covered by s. 221(1). This 
leaves inadvertent negligence, where no criminal guilty mind is 
involved. Dangerous driving, if it occupies any of the field of 
negligent driving, must at least be for that part in the field of 
inadvertent negligence, because that is the only type of negligent 
driving in a criminal sense that is left under the Code outside 
of s. 221(1) . . . .
I submit that O’Grady v. Sparling brings out that in so far as 
negligent driving is concerned, inadvertent negligence is the only 
kind which is involved in dangerous driving, the kind where 
mens rea is not an ingredient. There can be no negligent driving 
situated somewhere in “no man’s land” between advertent and 
inadvertent negligence. Section 221(1) deals with advertent, and 
I cannot think of any negligent driving left which could be made 
criminal except inadvertent. Consequently, dangerous driving 
does not require any “mental state” other than inadvertence.46
From this reasoning it follows that, fti answer to the third 
argument, the statute does, by necessary implication, rule out mens 
rea as a constituent part of the crime of dangerous driving. In the 
learned Judge’s view, a further answer is to be found in the very 
wording of section 221(4) which defines the offence.
The offence created in this section is a very definite offence. The 
section says that the following things create the offence:
(a) One must drive a motor vehicle.
(b) It must be on a street, road, highway, or other public place.
(3 ) The driving must be in a manner that is dangerous.
(4 ) The danger must be to the public.
(5 ) Regard must be had to all the circumstances.
(6 ) The nature, condition and use of said places must be taken 
into consideration.
(7 ) The amount of traffic at the time must be considered.
(8 ) The amount of traffic reasonably expected must also be 
considered.
I cannot see how one can look at all these ingredients and say 
that a reserve is contemplated requiring some sort of guilty mind 
before the offence is complete. (1 ) , (2 ) , (4 ) , (5 ) , (6 ) , (7 ) , and 
(8 ) are definite facts where there cannot be any question of the 
individual driver’s own thoughts or ideas. The only ingredient
46 R. v. Jeffers, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 346, at pp. 373-4.
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that can possibly have anything to do with any mental element 
is (3 ) , that is, the manner of driving. It might be argued that 
he controls the said manner and that before he can be guilty 
he must have a so-called guilty mind. It appears to me that the 
whole section creates such a prohibition that all the section deals 
with is the physical fact in regard to the manner of driving and 
nothing else. It matters little what the driver has in mind. It is 
the manner that is provided against. This must show that the 
mental element is of no importance.47
In effect, theh, “manner”, as used in this section should be 
interpreted as “in a way that is dangerous”. On this interpreta­
tion, the decisive test as to the “quality” of the driving becomes 
a purely objective one.
This, then, is the reasoning upon which Pottier Co. Ct., J. 
supports the position that mens rea is not imported in the offence. 
To it may be added the view expressed by Currie J. (with whom 
Bissett J. concurred) on the appeal. These two judges, agreeing 
with the finding of the trial judge on the question of mens rea, 
regard the enactment erf section 221(4) as an undertaking by 
Parliament, following the marked English trend away from any 
traditional concept of mens rea*9 to meet a problem of grave 
national concern by means of an absolute prohibition. Currie J. 
thus puts it:
The congested state of traffic on our highways today, the out- 
ragiously reckless conduct of so many drivers and the mounting 
toll of accidents require that the applicability of doctrines of 
another day to new and changed conditions should be frequently 
examined and not rigidly adhered to for the sake of adherence.40
Again:
The theory of absolute prohibition is not new. It arose out of 
the exigencies of the situation that brought it into being; it is the 
handmaid of the legislative subject-matter, designed to remove 
or to control certain things that disturb the good order of society.
This instrument is used to a considerable extent today in matters 
of public health and safety on the highway. Perhaps, too, there 
may be signs of a trend that a presumption may be displaced by 
using the other side o f the coin, that is to say, that recourse may 
be had to that other legitimate instrumentality— the subject- 
matter with which the legislation deals, which, said Wright J. in 
Sherras v. De Rutzen, (1895) 1 Q.B. 918 at 921, should be con­
sidered as well as the displacement of mens rea by express 
words.80
47 Ibid., at pp. 371-2.
48 Cf., A. W. Mewett, ‘T h e  Shifting Basis of Criminal Law”, (1963-64) 
6 Crim. Law Q. 468.
49 Jeffers v. The Queen (1965), 45 C.R. 177, at p. 182.
50 Ibid., at p. 184.
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IV. Retention of Mens Rea
The case for retaining mens rea as a constituent element of 
dangerous driving may be garnered from several sources. One of 
these is the decision of Coffin J. (with whom Patterson J. con­
curred) in Jeffers v. The Queen.*1 The learned Judge bases his 
position on two grounds. The first is the undisputed fact that 
mens rea was an element of the offence of dangerous driving under 
the old section 285(6). The cases of Loiselle v. The Queen,*- Rex 
v. Miller*3 and Rex v. Harrison54 support this view.
The second branch of Coffin J.’s argument involves a con­
sideration of mens rea as a general principle of criminal law and 
of the interpretation of criminal legislation in reference to that 
principle. Here, much reliance is placed upon what was said by 
the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in Regina v. Jollimore** which 
involved driving a motor vehicle while disqualified contrary to 
section 225(3) of the Code. In the course of his judgment 
MacDonald J. said:
Accordingly there is every reason to believe that the common 
law doctrine of mens rea and related doctrines as to mistake of 
fact, are fully operative and require for their exclusion some 
positive indication (by express words or necessary implication) 
of a contrary intention.86
What has happened in Canada as well as in England is that 
where an enactment has been devoid of reference to such doctrine 
or to a mental requirement (usually indicated by such words as 
“knowingly”, “maliciously”, etc.) the courts have inferred an 
intention of the legislature to punish the prohibited act regardless 
of the presence or absence of any particular mental element and 
have done so by assumption from the nature of the public 
interest affected by the act. In many cases this assumption is 
impossible, for it rests upon the judge’s evaluation o f the degree 
of urgency which prompted Parliament to enact the measure. 
Though some glimpse of this may be afforded by the lightness 
or gravity of the penalty, that circumstance is often unilluminat- 
ing. The real gravamen of complaint against such judicial 
assumption of purpose has been well-described by Glanville 
Williams:
“Every criminal statute is expressed elliptically. It is not possible 
in drafting to state all the exceptions and qualifications that are 
intended . . . , The exemptions belong to the general part of the
51 Ibid., at pp. 190-97.
52 (1953), 109 C.C.C. 31.
53 [1944] O.W.N. 617; [1945] 1 D.L.R. 227.
54 [1948] O.W.N. 829.
55 (1962), 36 C.R. 300.
56 Ibid., at p. 310.
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criminal law, which is implied into specific defences . . . Now  
the law of mens rea belongs to the general part of the law, and it 
is not reasonable to expect Parliament every time it creates a new 
crime to enact it or even make reference to it.
“The social purpose of a statute may be looked at in order to 
determine the type of conduct that Parliament intended to pro­
hibit; but how can it show an intention to dispense with proof of 
mens rea? The question is not one of the social purposes of a 
particular statute but of fundamental criminal policy. The inten­
tion to create strict responsibility ought always to be evidenced 
by the words of a statute, not guessed at from its social purpose.” 
(Criminal Law, p. 270)57
At this point the opposing view of Roach J. A. of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Rex v. Pee-Kay Smallwares Limited?* should 
be noted. He thus gives his view:
Where the language used is equally consistent with the intention 
of the legislature having been that mens rea should not be an 
ingredient of the offence as that it should, the question may be 
solved by looking at the nature of the subject matter of the 
legislation. That legislation may so vitally affect the public inter­
est or the interest of the state that the inference is irresistible 
that the legislature intended that the mere doing of the act 
thereby forbidden should constitute the offence, regardless of the 
intention of the doer.
A different approach to the interpretation of section 221(4) 
was taken by Tavender D.C.J. in the Alberta case of Regina v. 
Lykkemark,60 The question before the court was whether section 
135(b) of The Vehicles and Highway Traffic Act,®1 which creates 
the offence of careless driving, is not repugnant to section 221(4) 
of the Code and is not ultra vires of the provincial legislature. The 
learned trial judge had resort to the Oxford New English Diction­
ary which defines “careless” as:
(1 ) Free from care, anxiety or apprehension.
(2 ) Unconcerned; not caring or troubling oneself; not solicitous, 
regardless, having no care of, about or to.
(3 ) Not taking due care, not paying due attention to what one 
does, inattentive, negligent, thoughtless, inaccurate.
And it defines “dangerous” as:
Fraught with danger or risk, causing or occasioning danger; 
perilous, hazardous, risky, unsafe.
57 Ibid., at pp. 310-11.
58 [1948] 1 D.L.R. 235; see also Annotation, “Mens Rea” (1952-3),
15 C.R. 349.
59 Ibid., at pp. 242-3.
60 (1965), 51 W.W.R. 624.
61 R.S.A. 1955, c. 356; substituted (1963), 12 Eliz. II, c. 72 (A lta.).
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The learned trial judge then proceeds:
In coming to a conclusion in this case, “we are here on rather 
delicate ground” as Duff, C. J. said in the Egan case. . . ,62 
I think, however, that I am justified in basing my decision on the 
clear English meaning of the words “careless” and “dangerous”.
It is my opinion that the word “dangerous” imports a consider­
ably greater degree of negligence than does the word “careless” 
and I class the former as advertent negligence.
It therefore follows that, in my view, Parliament has not chosen 
to define inadvertent negligence as a crime and that the Alberta 
careless driving section is intra vires the province and the section 
has not been rendered inoperative by sec. 221(4) of the Criminal 
Code. . . .6S
Ih Goodfellow v. The Queen,6* Casey J. (Rivard J. concur­
ring) of the Quebec Appeal Court expressed the view that:
It would be unwise to attempt a precise definition of “dangerous 
driving”. However, since one must identify the type of driving 
that attracts criminal as well as civil sanction, I would say that 
the offence of s. 221(4) requires an element that need not be 
established when only civil responsibility is involved and, that 
this element is the deliberate incurring of risks that render almost 
inevitable the consequences contemplated by the Code— the threat 
of injury or damage to persons or property. Once this element is 
established, the difference between the criminal negligence and 
the dangerous driving of the Code becomes one of degree.85
The foregoing exhausts the judicial opinion on the matter in 
Canada to the present time. Surprisingly little has been contri­
buted to the discussion by Canadian writers. But in a valuable 
article66 T. D. Macdonald, Q.C., discussing the effect of the 1961 
amendment to the Code, expressed the view that:
Apparently, then, (leaving out of consideration constructive 
murder) there are four states of mind to be considered in con­
nection with the careless or negligent operation of a motor 
vehicle.
1. Carelessness giving rise to civil liability:
2. Serious carelessness warranting conviction under a pro­
vincial statute;
3. Advertent negligence warranting conviction for dangerous 
driving; and
4. Recklessness warranting conviction where death ensues, 
for manslaughter.67
62 Provincial Secretary of P.E.I. v. Egan, [1941] S.C.R. 396.
63 (1965), 51 W.W.R. 624, at p. 628.
64 (1965), 44 C.R. 113.
65 Ibid., at 113-14.
66 (1963), 6 Can. Bar Jo. 122.
67 Ibid., at p. 134.
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Despite the unqualified conclusion he reached in the third of 
these categories the author does raise the question “whether the 
enactment of section 221(4) revives the argument as to the consti­
tutional validity of provincial legislation relating to driving a motor 
vehicle without due care and attention”.88 Since the Supreme Court 
of Canada had decided in O ’Grady v. Sparling09 that such provin­
cial legislation dealt with inadvertent negligence one may assume 
that, in raising this question, Mr. Macdonald recognized the pos­
sibility that judicial interpretation of section 221(4) might favour 
the classifying of dangerous driving as inadvertent negligence. No 
doubt he was encouraged in this view by knowledge of the recent 
developments in England and probably as well by the statement of 
Cartwright J. in his dissenting judgment in the O ’Grady case to the 
effect that when section 285(6) of the old Code was in force it 
was arguable that the words therein contained, “or in a manner 
which is dangerous to the public having regard to all the circum­
stances of the case”, had the effect of attaching penal consequences 
to inadvertent negligence.70
The question of a possible constitutional problem arising out 
of the interpretation of section 221(4) was raised as well in a 
comment on R. v. Evans which appeared in The Criminal Law 
Quarterly.71 This follows a comment on the same case which 
appeared in The Criminal Law Review,72 where the following 
observation is made:
It is unfortunate that it should be held that this offence (danger­
ous driving) can be committed by even the slightest negligence.
It virtually destroys the distinction between dangerous and care­
less driving. . . .  If Parliament did not intend such a distinction, 
it is curious that it provided for two distinct offences, one of 
which was plainly intended to be of a more serious nature than 
the other.7*
In reference to this the later comment says:
We must agree wholeheartedly with this observation. We might 
even add that in Canada it is absolutely necessary to find a dis­
tinction if the two offences are both to be held intra vires, a 
problem which our Federal form of government has to face but 
which the unitary system of government in England does not 
experience. As Canadians we cannot then agree, even though we 
wanted to, that the formula “careless driving-dangerous driving” 
has any validity.74
68 Ibid.
69 (1960), 128 C.C.C. 1.
70 Ibid., at p. 10.
71 (1963-64), 6 Crim. Law Q. 3.
72 1963 Crim. Law Rev. 112.
73 Ibid., at p. 114.
74 (1963-64), 6 Crim. Law Q., at p. 6.
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As we have seen, in Regina v. Lykkenmark,75 a clear distinc­
tion was drawn between these offences, with the provincial legisla­
tion being held intra vires. It remains to be seen, however, whether 
such legislation will meet with a similar fate when the question 
comes before the courts, as surely it must, elsewhere in Canada.
The Canadian comment goes on to point out the “ludicrous 
situation” that would arise if Canadian courts were to accept the 
Evans doctrine. It would mean that the more serious offence of 
dangerous driving could be committed by an act which would not 
warrant a conviction of the lesser offence of careless driving which 
requires a higher degree of culpability than the Evans case seems 
to demand. This view is based on the analysis of the offence of 
careless driving by MacKay J. A. in R. v. Beauchamp.™ With 
reference to a charge of driving without due care and attention 
under section 29(1) of The Highway Traffic Act of Ontario77 the 
learned judge was of the view that the standard of care and skill 
to be applied is not that of perfection. A driver is required to 
exercise a reasonable amount of skill, and to do what an ordinary 
prudent person would do in the circumstances. The standard is an 
objective one, fixed in relation to the safety of other users of the 
highway. It is not enough, however, to support a conviction under 
section 29(1) that the accused’s conduct should be shown to fall 
below this standard. Since the subsection creates an offence that 
is quasi-criminal in nature, it must appear that the accused’s con­
duct has been of such a nature that it can be considered a breach 
of duty to the public, and as such deserving of punishment by the 
state.
It is submitted that the driver who exhibits “the smallest amount 
of negligence” or who is doing “his incompetent best” would not 
be guilty of the offence of careless driving as defined by MacKay 
J. A. Still less could he be said to be guilty of the more serious 
offence of dangerous driving.
In concluding this part some attention must be given to sec­
tion 569(4) of the Code which provides that:
Where a count charges an offence under section 192, 193 . . . 
arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle . . .  or an 
offence under subsection (1 ) of section 221, and the evidence 
does not prove such offence but does prove an offence under 
subsection (4 ) of section 221 . . .  the accused may be convicted 
of an offence under subsection (4 ) of section 221. . . .
75 (1965), 51 W.W.R. 624.
76 [1953] O R. 422.
77 R.S.O., 1950, c. 167.
64 I7JV.B. LAW  JOURNAL
Since sections 192, 193, and 221(1) all deal with offences 
involving criminal negligence, the fact that dangerous driving is 
ah included offence in each of them means that it too must contain 
an element of advertent negligence. In the New Brunswick case 
of Prosser v. The Queen78 McNair C. J., delivering the judgment of 
the court, defined an included offence as . . one, sometimes 
spoken of as a ‘lesser offence’, all the essential ingredients of which 
are to be found among the essential ingredients of the offence 
charged”.79
Elsewhere it has been pointed out that:
The term “lesser offence” often used to indicate an “included 
offence” is misleading, for an included offence is one which is 
part of another offence and not one which is of a minor but related 
character.80
The conclusion to be drawn from these two statements is 
that the offence of dangerous driving is part of the offence of 
criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle and that 
its essential ingredients are to be found among those of the latter 
offence. From this it is arguable that one of the essential ingredients 
of the offence of dangerous driving is advertent negligence.
V. Conclusion
An analysis of the foregoing arguments in support of the 
“absolute prohibition” position reveals that they rest very heavily 
upon a particular view of what Parliament “must have intended” 
by the 1961 amendment to the Code. It seems clear that the ulti­
mate resolution of the present controversy will centre around an 
interpretation of Parliament’s intention by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. It is perhaps unfortunate that the conventional rules of 
interpretation of statutes to which our courts adhere prevent them, 
at least openly, from having recourse to the one source that might 
make certain what Parliament did intend, viz., the expressions of 
policy and the debates which accompanied the passage of the bills 
through Parliament. We are not so restricted in our investigation. 
This comment, therefore, will conclude with a consideration of the 
relevant debate.
The matter was first introduced in the Commons on March 26,
1961, by Mr. Baldwin (Peace River) who directed the following 
question, which is instructive in its content, to the Minister of 
Justice:
78 (1959), 127 C.C.C. 111.
79 Ibid., at p. 114.
80 P. J. Gloin, “Included Offences” (1961-2), 4 Crim. Law Q. 160.
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Having in mind the slaughter and the necessity of striving to cut 
down the accidents and this dreadful toll of human lives which 
continues to infest our highways, does the Minister think it might 
be worth while to consider restoring an offence of an intermediate 
nature where convictions might more readily be obtained, rather 
than having only the offence of criminal negligence of which 
juries and judges are loath to convict?81
To this Justice Minister Fulton replied that he was glad to be 
able to say that “in our study of this matter we have come to the 
conclusion that [this] suggestion is a proper one”.82 Then on 
June 19, 1961, the Minister introduced the Bill to amend the Code. 
Included among the suggested amendments was the addition of 
subsection (4) to section 221. In reference to this the Minister 
said:
Another amendment which I am sure will be of great interest to 
the house generally, and perhaps particularly to lawyers, is a 
provision of the bill which restores the offence of dangerous 
driving which used to be an offence under the old code. At the 
time of the Criminal Code revision, however, this offence was 
dropped in favour of the offence of criminal negligence in the 
operation of a motor vehicle. There is a long history, both in 
this country and in other countries, of an attempt to formulate an 
offence under which juries would convict, in appropriate cases, 
for the reckless or dangerous operation of a motor vehicle which 
caused death or bodily harm. Juries at one time shied away from 
convicting persons of manslaughter arising out of death caused 
by the negligent operation of motor vehicle because of the rather 
awesome connotation of that word.
This tendency led to the enactment, some years before the 
Criminal Code revision, of the offence of reckless or dangerous 
driving, coupled with a provision to the effect that if upon a 
charge of manslaughter the jury was not satisfied that man­
slaughter was proved, it might convict of that other offence. 
Apparently, juries have tended similarly to shy away from con­
victing for criminal negligence in such circumstances. At the 
present time, the offence of dangerous driving having been 
removed, it is felt, and widely felt, that there are many cases 
where persons who have been guilty of criminal negligence in the 
operation of their motor vehicles are nevertheless escaping with 
a much milder penalty because of the reluctance of juries to 
convict of manslaughter or of criminal negligence.
We are accordingly reinstating, at the request of the provinces, 
the old offence of dangerous driving. We are however, omit­
ting the word “reckless” because to employ the word seems 
to have the effect of elevating the offence to the same plane as 
criminal negligence, thus creating a distinction without a differ­
ence which would make it very difficult to charge juries.83
81 Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 1960-61, Vol. V at p. 5410; 
italics added.
82 Ibid., at p. 5418.
83 Ibid., Vol. VI, at pp. 6540-41.
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In the debate which ensued Mr. Aiken (Parry Sound- 
Muskoka) made the following observations:
While the technical reasons for omitting the dangerous driving 
section from the Code when it was rewritten are well known to 
members of the legal profession, I believe the general public 
failed to understand the significance. Many people never did 
quite understand why dangerous driving was no longer an 
offence. Dangerous driving, of course, always has been an 
offence, only under a different classification and a different name.
. . . The criminal negligence section was not particularly 
designed to cover dangerous driving of a motor vehicle; never­
theless it was included as part of the general offence of criminal 
negligence. Now it is made very clear that dangerous driving 
of a motor vehicle on the highways is in itself an offence.84
And Mr. Deschatelets (Maisonneuve-Rosemont) expressed the 
view that:
. . .  As for section 4 which makes it an offence to operate a 
motor vehicle in a way which endangers the public’s safety, 
that is merely the re-enactment of a provision which existed 
before. . . .M
Finally, Mr. Paul (Berthier-Maskinonge-Delanaudiere) observed 
that:
Considering the dangers incidental to driving nowadays on our 
increasingly congested highways, I feel we must take stricter steps 
to bring to reason those who drive their vehicles without paying 
any heed to the rights of those they meet on the highways. . . .
I believe we are right in being even stricter with those who, 
because of carelessness, youth, stupidity or intoxication constitute 
real hazards to the public safety.80
These excerpts represent the views of the members who spoke 
on the amendment. It is submitted that only the last of these, the 
view of Mr. Paul, could possibly be construed as supporting the 
absolute prohibitionist position. Taken as a whole, the speeches 
give a clear indication that it was the intention of the Government 
and of Parliament simply to clarify the then existing situation 
regarding motor vehicles offerees under the Code. It was the 
failure of the courts to recognize that dangerous driving was an 
included offence under section 221(1) that necessitated this clari­
fication. The fact that Parliament chose to achieve this end by 
adding the new subsection (4) rather than by changing the wording 
of section 221(1) should not change the effect of the amendment. 
It was not intended that a “new” offence of dangerous driving be 
created thereby.
84 Ibid., at p. 6548.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., at p. 6561.
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In the not improbable event that the final pronouncement on 
this matter comes down on the side of the absolute prohibitionists, 
it will be well to keep in mind just what significance this would 
have in relation to the accused driver. In particular, it is to be 
recognized that this would not leave him defenceless. For, regard­
less of the fate of mens rea, the actus reus will continue to be an 
essential element of the offence. Thus, in order for the prohibited 
act to be committed there must be a willed movement or omis­
sion.87 There must be an intent in the actus reus itself, irrespective 
of mens rea.** If, therefore, an accused person is not driving 
voluntarily, as for example, when he is struck with a stone, attacked 
by a swarm of bees or overcome by a sudden illness which he 
could not reasonably have anticipated, he could not be accused 
of driving dangerously.89
87 See Glanville Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part, 2nd ed. 
(1961), pp. 11-13.
88 See generally, Gerard La Forest, “Mens Rea in Hunting Offences”, 
(1961-2), 4 Crim. Law Q. 437.
89 R. v. Jeffers, [1964] 2 C.C.C. at 358.
